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Abstract. This paper proposes to integrate security parameters into the Service 
Level Specification (SLS) template proposed in the Tequila project to improve 
SLA-based management of QoS [8, 21]. Integrating those parameters in the 
QoS part of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) specification is essential in 
particular for secure multimedia services since the QoS is negotiated when the 
multimedia service is deployed. Security mechanisms need to be negotiated at 
deployment time when sensible multimedia information is exchanged. In this 
paper we show that including security parameters in the SLA specification 
improves the SLA-based management of QoS and therefore the negotiation, 
deployment and use of the secure multimedia service. The parameters this paper 
proposes to integrate have the advantage to be understandable by both the end-
users and service providers. 
1 Introduction 
Today, many multimedia services are available to end-users over the Internet. They 
allow the exchange of more or less sensitive information needing different levels of 
protection. These services have generally Quality of Service (QoS) requirements 
according to the medias used (audio, video, text, etc.) and also security requirements 
depending on the type of the service employed and the sensibility of the data they 
exchanged. For example a personal electronic multimedia medical file exchange 
requires a high security protection whereas multimedia e-mail or videoconference 
services might not have the same security requirements. 
The protection during the exchange is usually achieved using security mechanisms 
and protocols. However, adding security to a service increases the resource 
consumption and the delay of the exchange, and so decreases the quality of the 
service. The Centre for Information Systems Security Studies and Research 
(Monterey California) published documents on these issues [9, 24].  
To provide the best possible QoS for secure services, we think that security needs to 
be negotiated and deployed at the same time than QoS since security processing 
consumes resources from the end-user and the provider (e.g.: CPU, throughput, delay) 
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and has therefore an impact on the QoS. We suggest putting QoS and security 
together for negotiation and deployment in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
Specification called Service Level Specification (SLS). A SLA is a specific contract 
between a service provider and its customers [26]. It contains, on one hand, general 
information to identify the customer and the service to provide. On the other hand, it 
contains technical information to identify the required quality for those services [26, 
27]. This second (technical) part corresponds to the SLS. The integration of QoS in 
SLS is the subject of many projects and publications [5, 10, 2, 11, 12, 20, 13]. They 
are presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2. The SLA specifications used or defined in these 
projects are not explicitly considering security. 
Our proposal is to extend the SLS template defined by the members of the Tequila 
project using parameters to express security and also information on the impact of 
security mechanisms on the QoS. The selection of these parameters has been the 
subject of a previous publication [4]. Integration of such parameters would allow the 
improvement of SLA-based management of QoS with the generation of network 
policies that ensure the reservation of adequate amount of resources for both the 
security and QoS needs. In addition, integration of security parameters within the SLS 
would enable service providers to propose Security of Service (SoS) to their 
customers. This allows customers to get the level of security they require for their 
services, without needing to be experts in security and without necessary having the 
appropriated security mechanisms available at their host. 
This paper gives in Section 2 a state of the art on SLS for QoS and SoS management. 
Section 3 describes how to insert selected SoS parameters in an existing SLS. Section 
4 presents the mapping of SLS parameters onto network policies and Section 5 gives 
an example of mapping. Section 6 presents existing studies and discusses issues on 
the influence of security mechanisms on network and service performance to improve 
SLA-based management of QoS and SoS. Section 7 concludes on open issues and 
perspectives of this work. 
2 Service Level Specifications for QoS and security management 
In this section we first describe existing work on SLS for QoS management. We then 
present existing work on security for SLS and finally we explain our choices to 
integrate security in SLS. 
2.1 Service Level Specifications for QoS management 
A lot of work deals with SLS and their role for QoS management. We can mention 
various projects such as Aquila (Adaptive Resource Control for QoS Using an IP-
based Layered Architecture) [5, 10], Cadenus (Creation and Deployment of End-User 
Services in Premium IP Networks) [2], Mescal (Management of End-to-end Quality 
of Service across the Internet At Large) [11], Sequin (Service Quality across 
Independently Managed Networks) [12] and Tequila (Traffic Engineering for Quality 
of Service in the Internet, at Large Scale) [20, 13].  
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The Aquila, Cadenus and Tequila consortia provide IP Premium services over the 
Internet [18]. These three projects have worked together to define an SLS template 
tailored to IP networks. The resulting SLS consists of the four following units:  
• The common unit, which contains general information identifying the context of 
the SLA (information about the provider, the customer, the service type, the time 
and the period of SLA applicability). 
• The topology unit, which gives information on the points used by the service to 
access the provider domain, and the relationship of traffic generation and 
consumption amongst them. 
• The QoS unit, which describes the traffic streams that are subject to the SLA and 
the nature and extent of service differentiation provided to them.  
• The monitoring unit, which defines a set of parameters that need to be collected 
and reported to the customer in order to be compared with the SLA ones. 
Each unit is also divided in sub-units that are not detailed here. 
This SLS template is in the process of being standardised through the IETF. The 
documents containing the drafts are [25, 21, 22, 8].  Furthermore, this work is used in 
other projects such as Sequin or Mescal. The Sequin project handles the Tequila work 
to provide an SLS template for the IP Premium service between National Research 
and Education Networks and the trans-European research backbone GEANT [23]. 
The Mescal project, which builds on Tequila results, uses the Tequila SLS for inter-
domain interactions. It aims at negotiating the QoS between Customer and Service 
Provider (SP) and between two SPs, while the Tequila project focused mainly on 
Customer-SP interactions [19]. 
2.2 Service Level Specification for SoS management 
Little work has been conducted on security integration in SLS. The Arcade Project is 
one of the exceptions. It defines an SLS for IPsec [1, 28]. It proposes security 
parameters to integrate into SLS by succinctly defining a network level security SLS 
specific to a Linux implementation of the IPsec protocol [17]. Two categories of 
parameters are distinguished in this SLS: the SLA-dependent and the SLA-independent 
parameters. The SLA-dependent parameters are inherent to the SLA. The SLA-
independent gather the parameters that can be reused in others SLAs, where a similar 
service is required. They consist of parameters that are used in the IPsec security 
association. Their objective is to map the SLS onto the IETF/DMTF IPsec 
Configuration Policy Information Model [14]. 
2.3 Our choices to integrate security in SLS 
Of the studied projects none is considering both quality and security of service. We 
are going to use the Arcade project and the Tequila project as a basis for our work.  
The SLS defined in the Tequila project represents a complete specification for the IP 
service and is becoming a standard. However it is specific to QoS management and 
does not include security parameters despite the impact of security processing on the 
quality of the service. It is a good base to add security parameters. 
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The Arcade project is interesting for its security SLS but it does not consider the QoS 
parameters and the SLS parameters are specific to a Linux implementation of IPsec.  
 
The next section presents how and where to insert the security parameters in the 
Tequila SLS template. 
3 Extension of the Tequila SLS template with security 
parameters 
This section describes how we integrate the SoS parameters identified in [4] in the 
Tequila SLS template to improve the QoS management of secure services. 
These parameters have the advantage to be interpretable by both end-users (EU) and 
service providers (SP). Two abstraction levels are therefore available: one abstract 
level that can be qualified, to be understandable by non expert EU and a precise level 
that can be quantified, interpretable by the expert EU and its SP to negotiate the 
service configuration and deployment. The identified qualitative parameters 
correspond to the common security services (confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
and non-repudiation) plus optional parameters derived from security protocols 
(security protocol, tunnelling and no-replay). To each qualitative parameter 
corresponds a set of quantitative values.  
Supplying SoS is a quality guarantee for secure multimedia services. It is essential to 
consider security as a parameter for quality to provide a good quality to the service. 
Also, security processing acts on the quality of the service. It increases resource 
consumption, induced delay and traffic load. Considering security as a QoS 
functionality makes it easier to take into account the impact of security on the QoS. It 
is also a logical placeholder since security and QoS are applied to the same traffic. 
Also, as the traffic is already described in the traffic descriptor sub-unit of QoS unit it 
avoids the useless repetition of the traffic description. This sub-unit contains 
combination of DiffServ Information, Source information, Destination Information 
and Application Information [8]. The Source, Destination and Application 
Information is necessary for security protocol configuration [17, 3]. 
So to introduce SoS parameters in the SLS, we choose to add a new sub-unit to the 
QoS unit of the Tequila SLS template, the SoS parameters sub-unit, rather than 
adding a specific security unit. This sub-unit contains the common parameters plus 
the selected security protocol and the protocol options described in [4].  
Fig. 1 presents the extension of the Tequila SLS QoS unit for security with 
quantitative guarantees. Only the two sub-units useful for SoS management are 
shown. The other QoS sub-units are outside the scope of this paper. The additional 
parameters are in bold. The first column presents the sub-unit. The second and third 
columns correspond respectively to the qualitative and associated quantitative 
parameters, and the fourth contains examples of associated selected values. 
The negotiated values associated to the SoS parameters can be either qualitative or 
quantitative depending on the EU expertise. In the first case, a level, an on/off choice 
or a default value can be attributed to the parameters. In the second case, a subset of 
specific parameters is associated to the common ones except for the non-repudiation 
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parameter which is ‘on or off’ depending on the type of authentication algorithm. 
Therefore, if non-repudiation is selected, the authentication algorithm must be a 
digital signature. 
 
Sub-Unit Qualitative Parameters Quantitative Parameters Value 
Diffserv Information DSCP 11101 
Type IPV4 Address 
Source Information Address 
Value 190.20.1.1 
Type IPV4 Address 
Destination Information Address 
Value 200.20.1.1 
Protocol number 6 




Destination port 1566 
Security protocol Value IPsec_ESP (or 50) 
Alg Name  DES 
Alg Category  Block 
Alg Mode  CBC 
Alg Block size 64 bits 
Alg Key length 56 bits 
Confidentiality 
Alg round number 16 
Alg Type MAC 
Alg Name HMAC Authentication 
Alg Key length 128 bits 
Integrity Hash function MD5 
Non-repudiation Value Off 
Type IPV4 Address Source 
address Value 190.20.1.0 
Type  IPV4 Address 
Tunnelling 
Destination 
address Value 200.20.1.1 
SoS 
parameters 
No-replay Sequence Number length 32 bits 
Fig. 1. In Bold proposed SoS parameters structure and example of quantitative SoS parameters 
During the negotiation, it is possible not to select any of the security parameters or to 
use only part of it. For example, the required SoS can be confidentiality only. In this 
case, the common and optional parameters that are not selected can be qualitatively 
specified with the ‘no’, ‘on’ or ‘off’ value, or not specified at all. In the case where 
optional parameters are not specified, the options default values are attributed 
according to the security protocol selected. 
In case quantitative values are attributed, as presented in Fig. 1, the SP can directly 
consider the SLS to configure security. However, in case of qualitative agreements, 
the SP must interpret the values. This interpretation is done through mapping tables 
such as Table 1, where a level corresponds to a set of algorithms to choose from. This 
choice is also possible with quantitative guarantees. Several alternatives can be 
associated to a particular SoS parameter. 
Table 1 presents some examples of quantitative parameters for confidentiality. The 
‘no’ qualitative level corresponds to the ‘NULL’ encryption algorithm. This value is 
derived from the IPsec and TLS protocols RFC [17, 15, 16, 3]. It is used to specify no 
encryption appliance. The NULL value is also used for Authentication and Integrity. 
The ‘Security Protocol’ column allows to identify the protocol(s) supporting the 
algorithm. 
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Table 1. Example of a mapping table for confidentiality 








AES Block CBC 128 128 9 ESP, TLS 
3DES Block CBC 64 192 48 ESP, TLS High 
IDEA Block CBC 64 128 8 ESP, TLS 
RC5 Block CBC 64 128 16 ESP 
Medium 
Blowfish Block CBC 64 128 16 ESP 
DES Block CBC 64 56 16 ESP, TLS 
RC2 Block EBC 64 64 18 TLS Default 
DES Block EBC 64 56 16 TLS 
No NULL       
 
The quantitative parameters derived from the SLS are used by the SP to configure its 
network. To do this, the SP must be able to translate the SLS into policies. These 
policies are then used to configure the SP network to provide the required security. 
The next section describes this process. 
4 From SLS to Policies 
The policies on which we map the SLS are described in a previous paper [7]. These 
policies are organised in a three levels hierarchy (service level, network level and 
element level policies). A service level policy is translated into a network level policy, 
which is also translated into several element level policies that are sent to the network 
elements where they are enforced. 
Only SLS quantitative parameters are considered and mapped onto policies. The 
qualitative parameters must be previously translated in quantitative parameters 
through the mapping tables. 
Therefore, the quantitative SLS is translated into the network level and then element 
level policies, as described in Table 2 and Table 3, where: 
• <Sec-Prot> corresponds to the security protocol used (IPsec_AH, IPsec_ESP, 
TLS) 
• <C-Algo parameters> represents the different confidentiality quantitative 
parameters. Several algorithms can be specified. In this case, the algorithm list is 
specified in braces. E.g.: {(AES, block, CBC, 128, 128, 9), (IDEA, block, CBC, 
64, 128, 8), (3DES, block, 64, 192, 48)}. The NULL algorithm can be directly 
specified if confidentiality is not required.  
• <A-I-Algo parameters> represents the different authentication and integrity 
quantitative parameters. The SLS non-repudiation parameter is not specified in 
the policy. It depends on the digital signature use as authentication algorithm and 
it is not necessary in the policy to configure network. As for confidentiality, 
several algorithms can be specified. Each list of parameters is described in 
brackets and the list of algorithms in braces. The NULL algorithm can also be 
directly specified if authentication and integrity not required.  
• <Tunnelling parameters> corresponds to the type of the addresses and the IP 
source and destination addresses of the tunnel.  
• <Seq-Number Length> refers to the sequence number length specified in the 
SLS. 
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Table 2. Network level policy 
IF SourceIPaddress|UserIPaddresses = <SourceIPaddress|UserIPaddresses1..*> and SourcePortNo|UserportNo = 
<SourcePortNo|UserportNo> and DestinationIPAddress = DestinationIPAddress..(optional)> and 
DestinationPortNo = <DestinationPortNo (optional)>  
THEN CONNECT with <QoSDirection> and <ConnectionType> from|among <SourceIPAddress!..*>  
at <SourcePortNo|UserPortNo> to <destinationIPAddress!..*(optional)> at DestinationPortNo1 (optional)> with 
<PhBtype> and <Sec-Prot> with <C-Algo parameters> and <A-I-Algo parameters> and <Tunnelling 
parameters> and  <Seq-Number Length> 
Table 3. Network level policy for dissemination to the network elements 
IF SourceIPaddress|UserIPaddresses = <SourceIPaddress|UserIPaddresses1..*>  and SourcePortNo|UserportNo = 
<SourcePortNo|UserportNo> and DestinationIPAddress = DestinationIPAddress..(optional)>  and 
DestinationPortNo = <DestinationPortNo (optional)>  
THEN SET at <InterfaceIPaddress> with <PhBtype> and <Sec-Prot> with <C-Algo parameters> and <A-I-Algo 
parameters> and <Tunnelling parameters> and  <Seq-Number Length> 
 
The element policy parameter <InterfaceIPAddress> represents the nodes where the 
policy must be enforced, i.e. the nodes crossed by the traffic for which the SLA is 
negotiated. This parameter can be directly deduced from the ‘Topology unit’ of the 
SLS, since this unit describes the SP domain access nodes. 
 
The SLS to policy mapping will be now illustrated using an example. 
5 SLS to policy mapping example 
In this section we are only interested in the SoS parameters mapping from SLS to 
policy. Consider a End-User (EU) who wishes to secure its video-conferencing 
service. S/he expresses his/her requirements in qualitative terms and requires a 
security with a medium confidentiality and a high integrity/authentication. Therefore, 
the non-repudiation parameter receives the ‘off’ value and the protocol options 
(tunnelling and no-replay) will receive their default value. As for security protocol 
parameter, it will be derived from the result of the qualitative to quantitative 
parameters mapping. The obtained security SLS is depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
QoS Unit 









Fig. 2. The EU negotiated security SLS with qualitative guarantees 
These qualitative parameters must be derived into quantitative ones to be interpreted 
to configure and manage the SP network. The mapping tables described in Tables 4 
and Table 5 are used. The grey lines represent the quantitative values associated to the 
specified qualitative ones. 
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Table 4. Example of a mapping table for confidentiality 
Level Name Categ Mode Block size Key length Key rounds Security protocol 
AES Block CBC 128 128 9 ESP, TLS 
3DES Block CBC 64 192 48 ESP, TLS High 
IDEA Block CBC 64 128 8 ESP, TLS 
RC5 Block CBC 64 128 16 ESP 
Medium 
Blowfish Block CBC 64 128 16 ESP 
DES Block CBC 64 56 16 ESP, TLS 
RC2 Block CBC 64 40 18 TLS Default 
DES Block CBC 64 40 16 TLS 
No NULL       
Table 5. Example of a mapping table for authentication, integrity and non-repudiation 
Level N-R Value Auth Type Auth Name Auth key length Hash function Security Protocol 
off MAC HMAC 128 SHA-1 AH, ESP, TLS 
High 
off MAC HMAC 128 RIPEMD_160 AH, ESP 
Medium off MAC HMAC 128 MD5 AH, ESP, TLS 
Default off MAC HMAC 128 MD5 AH, ESP, TLS 
No off  NULL  NULL  
 
These two tables are used to identify the algorithms associated to the negotiated 
security level. As for the column named ‘Security protocol’, it identifies the protocol 
that uses the algorithm. 
We end up with the following alternatives. On one hand, the ‘medium’ level of 
confidentiality can be provided by the RC5 or Blowfish algorithms with ESP 
protocol. On the other hand, the ‘high’ importance of authentication/integrity can be 
provided by HMAC associated with the hash functions SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160, by 
using the AH, ESP or TLS protocols. The ESP protocol is therefore the only 
possibility since it is the only one proposing a ‘medium’ level of confidentiality. 
The network level policy will be created from these new data. The policy conflict 
verification and resolution will need to be done but its description is out of the scope 
of this paper. This policy is then derived in two element level policies. The Tables 6 
and 7 present these policies where the negotiated security parameters are in bold. In 
these Tables, the sequence number length is set to ‘32’. It corresponds to the IPsec 
default value of this parameter [4]. 
The first policy in Table 7 is enforced by the network node 1.1.1.0 managing the IP 
address 1.1.1.1. The second policy is enforced at the network node 2.2.2.0 managing 
the IP address 2.2.2.2. These policies will secure the videoconferencing traffic 
between the IP addresses 1.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.2. 
Mapping tables and policies offer a choice among several SoS solutions, each having 
a different impact on the QoS. 
Table 6. Network level policy derived from the SLS parameters 
IF UserIPaddress = 1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2  and UserPortNo = 8000 
THEN CONNECT with bi-directional and unicast among 1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2 at 8000 with AF11 
and ESP with {(RC5, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16), (Blowfish, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16)}  
and {(HMAC, 128, SHA-1), (HMAC, 128, RIPEMD_160)} and off and 32 
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Table 7. Element level policies derived from the SLS parameters 
IF SourceIPaddress = 1.1.1.1 and SourcePortNo = 8000 and DestinationIPAddress = 2.2.2.2 and 
DestinationPortNo=8000 THEN SET at 1.1.1.0  with AF11  
and ESP with {(RC5, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16), (Blowfish, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16)}  
and {(HMAC, 128, SHA-1), (HMAC, 128, RIPEMD_160)} and off and 32 
 
IF SourceIPaddress = 2.2.2.2 and SourcePortNo = 8000 and DestinationIPAddress = 1.1.1.1 and 
DestinationPortNo=8000 THEN SET at 2.2.2.0  with AF11  
and ESP with {(RC5, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16), (Blowfish, block, CBC, 64, 128, 16)}  
and {(HMAC, 128, SHA-1), (HMAC, 128, RIPEMD_160)} and off and 32 
 
In the next section we are going to discuss the impact of the choice of security 
parameters and algorithms on the service performance. This impact will need to be 
taken into account while negotiating the QoS. 
6 Security influence on network and service performance 
This section discusses the influence of security on network and service performance 
(in the context of our SLS for QoS and SoS). In our previous paper [4], we discussed 
how each SoS parameter affects the performance. The resources we study are CPU, 
memory and bandwidth. For each resource two types of costs are distinguished: 
initialisation and streaming costs. The initialisation represents the initialisation phase 
of the security mechanism process (including the negotiation), and the streaming 
represents the data packet emission. In [4] we consider the resources (CPU, memory 
and bandwidth) and their associated costs with each SoS parameter specified in our 
SLS. We determine how each SoS parameter influences the different resources and 
therefore the importance of the impact. The figure 3 summarises this study with a 

























(a) and (b)  
Fig. 3. Classification of SoS parameters resource consumption 
 
Fig. 3 (a) and (b) show the initialisation and streaming costs for CPU and memory. 
These resources are considered together since their consumption has the same origin. 
During the initialisation, CPU and memory costs are due to the initialisation of the no-
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replay sequence number and of the authentication and confidentiality algorithms. 
During the streaming phase the sequence number incrementation and checking, the 
creation of a new (tunnel) header for each packet and the processes of 
authentication/integrity and confidentiality algorithms consume also these two 
resources. Fig. 3 (c) presents the bandwidth costs while streaming. Our classification 
depends on the amount of data transferred for each specific SoS parameter. For 
example, the sequence number exchanged to ensure the no-replay is a 32 bits value, 
whereas the size of the added header for tunnelling is at least 20 or 40 bytes for 
respectively IPv4 and IPv6, or more, the size of data when padding is added to 
enciphered data can reach 255 bytes. The initialisation bandwidth cost is not shown 
here. Only the protocol has an impact on it for its security context establishment (key 
generation, negotiation of used algorithms, etc.). 
To determine the precise impact of the choice of the protocol on the bandwidth, we 
did run some tests that applied the IPsec protocols for different levels of security. We 
used the Ethereal tool [6], a network protocol analyser, to value bandwidth costs for a 
MPEG video and a DVD sequence. The multimedia sequences are read with VLC 
(Video LAN Client) on a laptop from a desktop running on Windows OS and are 
secured with the Windows OS IPsec Policy Tool. The data are exchanged over a 
LAN.  
The Windows IPsec Policy Tool provides confidentiality using 3DES or DES 
algorithms. The SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms associated with HMAC are available for 
authentication and integrity services. To measure the bandwidth costs, we did test two 
times for both multimedia sequences (MPEG and DVD) with all possible 
combinations of security protocols and algorithms (i.e. AH with SHA-1, AH with 
MD5, ESP with SHA-1, ESP with MD5, ESP with 3DES, ESP with DES, ESP with 
SHA-1 and 3DES, ESP with SHA-1 and DES, ESP with MD5 and 3DES and ESP 
with MD5 and DES). We can notice that the quality of the multimedia sequence, the 
level of confidentiality and the level of authentication and integrity do not have an 
impact on the bandwidth costs. Only the choices of the security services and of the 
protocol do have an impact.  
Table 8. Bandwidth costs for UDP and IPsec protocols 
Protocol  
Bandwidth cost during the 
initialisation (bytes) 
Bandwidth cost while 
streaming (bytes/packet) 
UDP not relevant 1358 
 AH Authentication and integrity 1688 1382 
Authentication and integrity 1712 1382 
Confidentiality 1712 1378 ESP 
Confidentiality, authentication and integrity 1712 1390 
 
The table 8 depicts the increase bandwidth costs before and after the inclusion of 
security. The bandwidth cost during the initialisation phase is expressed in bytes 
because it consists in the security context establishment (key generation, negotiation 
of used algorithms, etc.) and the number of exchanged packets is limited (10 for 
IPsec). While streaming, it is expressed in bytes per packets because it corresponds to 
the protocol processing, which depends on the multimedia file. Table 8 shows that the 
bandwidth initialisation cost depends only on the protocol. ESP consumes more 
resources than AH. During the streaming phase the bandwidth consumption varies 
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according to the chosen security services apart from the protocol. Confidentiality 
consumes less bandwidth than authentication and integrity, which consume fewer 
resources than confidentiality, authentication and integrity. This confirms our 
classification in Fig. 3 (c). 
We are now extending our tests to the other resources (CPU and memory), and for 
each SoS parameter.  
7 Conclusion and future work 
This paper has presented our research work on including security parameters in 
Service Level Agreements specification to improve the SLA based management of 
QoS for secure distributed multimedia services. It used the Tequila project SLS 
definition as a basis and extends it with SoS parameters. 
We identified the essential SoS parameter to integrate in the QoS part of an SLS. It 
consists of a set of network specific parameters useful for network security protocols 
configuration and to evaluate the impact on resource consumption and consequently 
on the QoS. We also highlighted the necessity for EUs to provide higher-level 
parameters to the SLS in order to express their SoS requirements in terms they 
understand. Then, we described the mapping of SLS parameters on policies and give 
an example of this mapping. Finally we discussed the influence of security on the 
performance of services and networks. It is essential to consider it to improve the QoS 
management. Our SoS quantitative parameters are useful to evaluate this influence. 
Currently, we continue our tests on the other resources consumptions for each SoS 
parameter. The objective is to determine and add parameters that are representative of 
the resource consumption into mapping tables. It can be useful to choose the most 
suitable algorithm and security protocol. It will improve the QoS management by 
adapting and optimising the resource consumption for security.  
Another step in our research will be the monitoring of SoS parameters. An SLA/SLS 
providing a secure service must contain a set of parameters that must be monitored 
and included in the monitoring unit to give the EU a guarantee that security is 
provided. This work can also be extended to SP to SP SLA/SLS. This will ensure the 
negotiation of an end to end secure service that respects the security policies across 
different domains. 
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